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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a m u n i c i p a l 
c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e S t a t e of 
U t a h , 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
v s . 
SUSAN WOMACK, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
C a s e N o . 20712 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. I s a d m i s s i o n of t h e r e s u l t s of a b r e a t h a l y z e r t e s t , 
where d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l f i r s t s t i p u l a t e s t o t h e r e q u i r e d 
f o u n d a t i o n a l t e s t i m o n y , t h e n o b j e c t s t o a d m i s s i o n of t h e t e s t f o r 
l a c k of f o u n d a t i o n , a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e g i v i n g t h i s Cour t 
a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n ? 
2. Does t h e s e l e c t i o n by an o f f i c e r of a p a r t i c u l a r t e s t 
a u t h o r i z e d by U t a h ' s Impl ied Consent Law (Utah Code Ann. , S e c t i o n 
1 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 10(a) ) , v i o l a t e a d e f e n d a n t ' s Due P r o c e s s o r Equal 
P r o t e c t i o n r i g h t s ? 
3 . Do f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t s v i o l a t e a d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s n o t 
:o g i v e e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t h i m s e l f under t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n ? 
4. Does an o f f i c e r ' s quest ion, "Have you had something to 
drink?" immediately a f te r stopping a defendant for an i l l e g a l 
tu rn , cons t i t u t e custodia l in te r rogat ion requiring a Miranda 
warning? 
5. Is i t cons t i t u t i ona l e r ror to admit the r e s u l t s of a 
breathalyzer t e s t administered within an hour of a r r e s t , without 
spec i f ic ins t ruc t ion to determine the blood alcohol level at the 
time of d r iv ing , where a defendant f a i l s to request such an 
ins t ruc t ion? 
6 . I s a d e f e n d a n t d e n i e d due p r o c e s s of law w h e r e , w i t h o u t 
o b j e c t i o n by t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e j u r y i s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e r e i s 
a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a p e r s o n m e e t i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y b l o o d a l c o h o l 
l e v e l i s under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l , b u t t h a t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n 
i s r e b u t t a b l e and t h e b u r d e n of p r o v i n g g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e 
d o u b t r e m a i n s w i th t h e C i t y ? 
I I 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Th i s i s an a p p e a l from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s a f f i r m a n c e of a 
j u r y c o n v i c t i o n of Appel lant -Womack f o r d r i v i n g unde r t h e i n f l u -
e n c e of a l c o h o l . 
I l l 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appel lant-Womack was c o n v i c t e d by a j u r y in t h e c i r c u i t 
c o u r t of v i o l a t i n g a c i t y o r d i n a n c e a g a i n s t o p e r a t i n g a motor 
v e h i c l e w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r . The 
- 2 -
a p p e l l a n t a p p e a l e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t which a f f i r m e d t h a t 
c o n v i c t i o n . A p p e l l a n t now s e e k s r e l i e f from t h e Supreme C o u r t , 
c l a i m i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s j u s t i f y r e v e r s a l of t h e 
c o n v i c t i o n . 
IV 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
The Appel lant-Womack was c o n v i c t e d by a j u r y in t h e C i r c u i t 
C o u r t and a p p e a l e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . 
The D i s t r i c t Cour t a f f i r m e d t h e judgment of t h e C i r c u i t 
C o u r t , and remanded t h e c a s e f o r e x e c u t i o n of t h e j u d g m e n t , w i t h 
a s t a y to f i l e t h i s a p p e a l . The D i s t r i c t Cour t d e c l i n e d to i s s u e 
a c e r t i f i c a t e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e . 
V 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The f a c t s , when viewed in a l i g h t f a v o r a b l e t o u p h o l d i n g t h e 
j u r y v e r d i c t , d e m o n s t r a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
1. On January 8, 1982, a t approximate ly 10:00 o ' c lock a .m. , 
t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r observed the Appellant-Womack d r iv ing west 
on 900 South between S t a t e and Main S t r e e t s . (R-209). 
2. As the Appellant-Womack approached Main S t r e e t , she 
en t e red the l e f t - h a n d t u r n l a n e . (R-211; 212) . Then, while about 
3 5 f e e t frcm the c rosswa lk , she a b r u p t l y turned in to the r i g h t -
hand lane of 900 South and then turned r i g h t on Main S t r e e t . 
(R-211) . These maneuvers v i o l a t e d Ci ty t r a f f i c laws in t h a t she 
did not s i g n a l , e i t h e r on e n t e r i n g the l e f t - hand tu rn lane or on 
- 3 -
turning r ight onto Main S t r e e t . (R-40). Further, the Appellant-
Womack executed the turn from the wrong l ane . (R-211, 272-273). 
3. The ar res t ing off icer pulled behind the Appellant-Womack 
on Main Street and turned on his overhead l i g h t s and siren to 
make a t r a f f i c stop for the i l l e g a l turn . (R-212-213). The 
appel lant did not pull to the side of Main S t r ee t , but stopped 
abruptly in the right-hand t r a f f i c l ane . (R-214). 
4. The a r res t ing off icer approached the car and asked the 
appel lant for her d r i v e r ' s l icense and r e g i s t r a t i o n . (R-214). 
He observed that the appe l l an t ' s speech appeared s l i gh t l y slurred 
and there was an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the 
c a r . (R-214, 215). The a r res t ing off icer then asked the 
appel lant if she had been dr inking, and appel lant repl ied tha t 
she had had something to d r ink . (R-215). 
5. Thereafter, the a r res t ing off icer asked the appel lant to 
ex i t the vehicle and walk to the sidewalk for some f ield sobr ie ty 
t e s t s . (R-215). Four d i f f e ren t t e s t s were conducted. (R-216-
222). Appellant 's performance of those t e s t s led the off icer to 
believe appel lant was under the influence of an intoxicat ing 
beverage. (R-223). After the t e s t s were performed, the 
ar res t ing off icer placed the Appellant-Womack under a r r e s t for 
driving while under the influence of a lcohol . (R-223). 
6. Appellant was taken to Sal t Lake County J a i l where a 
breathalyzer t e s t was administered by an off icer duly trained in 
the use of the breathalyzer machine. (R-236). The t e s t was 
- 4 -
idministered within an hour of the a r r e s t and showed a blood 
alcohol level of .18 percent . (R-20 9, 242, exhibi ts 2 and 3 
:ontained in R-40). 
7. At t r i a l , the City moved to dismiss the improper turn as 
a l e s se r included offense, and the motion was granted. 
(R-182). In accordance with a pr ior agreement, the City then 
asked appe l l an t ' s counsel to s t i pu l a t e whether the maintenance 
off icer for the breathalyzer would need to be ca l l ed . 
Appellant 's counsel responded that while he reserved the question 
of the cons t i tu t iona l v a l i d i t y of the t e s t i t s e l f under the Equal 
Protection Clause, he was not "challenging . . . the checking of 
the machines" and the City "wouldn't have to have somebody come 
down, they could handle i t by a proffer in saying that he checked 
i t a ce r t a in day before and whatever." (R-183; cf addit ional 
s t i pu l a t i on a t T-13 as quoted at p . 7 of appe l l an t ' s Brief) . In 
r e l i ance on that s t i pu l a t i on , the City then presented i t s case . 
8. The City cal led two witnesses: the ar res t ing off icer 
and the off icer who performed the breath t e s t . When the l a t t e r 
off icer was ca l l ed , appe l l an t ' s counsel did not object to the 
testimony regarding the t e s t . On the contrary , appe l l an t ' s 
counsel s t ipu la ted to iden t i f ica t ion and cross-examined the 
witness amply. (R-244-253; 256-261; 263-265). 
9. At the conclusion of the oral testimony, the City moved 
to admit the breathalyzer t e s t r e s u l t s and record. At tha t 
point , the appe l l an t ' s counsel objected, c i t ing among several 
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o t h e r g rounds , t he lack of foundat ion for the b r ea th t e s t . 
(R-307, 308-309) . The t r i a l judge over ru led the ob j ec t i on and 
admit ted the ev idence , based on a p p e l l a n t ' s a t t o r n e y ' s s t i p u l a -
t i o n . (R-310, 311) . 
The Ci ty and a p p e l l a n t both r e s t e d . (R-313) . The t r i a l 
c o u r t then i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y . (R-313-320). The a p p e l l a n t d id 
not o b j e c t to any j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , a l though i n t e r l i n e a t i o n s on 
the t r a n s c r i p t appea r , a p p a r e n t l y from the b r i e f i n g p r o c e s s . 
Relevant p o r t i o n s of t he se unobjected to i n s t r u c t i o n s , Womack's 
Br ie f , a re a s fo l lows : 
(A) Regarding the presumption of innocence , the j u r y was 
i n s t r u c t e d : 
A pe r son charged with a crime i s presumed to be innocent 
u n t i l she i s proven g u i l t y beyond a r easonab le 
d o u b t . . . This presumption of innocence i s a subs t an -
t i a l and e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the law and i s b inding upon 
the j u r y . . . The presumption of innocence must 
con t inue to p r e v a i l in the minds of the j u ry unless and 
u n t i l the ju ry i s s a t i s f i e d beyond a r ea sonab l e doubt a s 
to the g u i l t of the defendant and in case of a r e a s o n -
a b l e doubt , she i s e n t i t l e d to an a c q u i t t a l . (R-314) . 
(B) Regarding e v i d e n t i a r y presumpt ions , the ju ry was 
i n s t r u c t e d : 
You a r e i n s t r u c t e d by law and p r o s e c u t i o n s for the 
of fense of d r i v i n g a motor veh i c l e while under the 
i n f l uence of an i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r , the amount of 
a lcohol in the d e f e n d a n t ' s b lood, as shown by a chemical 
a n a l y s i s of the blood or b r e a t h , g ive r i s e to the 
fol lowing presumpt ions : * * * (R-317) . 
(C) If t h e r e was a t the time of d r i v i n g , 0.08 p e r c e n t 
or more by weight of a lcohol in the d e f e n d a n t ' s b lood , 
i t s h a l l be presumed t h a t the defendant was under the 
i n f luence of an i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r . (R-318). 
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These presumptions may be rebut ted . By t h a t , I mean 
tha t those presumptions can be overcome by competent 
evidence . . . the jury sha l l weigh a l l avai lable 
evidence introduced to determine whether or not the 
defendant was under the influence of an intoxicating 
l iquor • 
. . . The presumption referred to a r i se s only if the jury determines tha t a r e l i a b l e t e s t i s present . 
(R-318-319) . 
10. Appellant 's counsel made no objection whatsoever to any 
of these i n s t ruc t i ons , nor did he request any addit ional i n s t r u c -
t i o n s . After the jury was inst ructed and closing arguments were 
nade, the jury then r e t i r e d and l a t e r returned a verdic t of 
g u i l t y . (R-334). 
VI 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Appeals frcm c i r c u i t courts to th i s Court are precluded 
unless cons t i tu t iona l matters are involved. The scope of 
construction of an open court s t i pu l a t i on on the admiss ibi l i ty of 
a breathalyzer t e s t and the admission of evidence, raised by 
appel lant , do not r i s e to the s t a tu re of a cons t i tu t iona l issue 
and must be dismissed. 
2. Even if the issue of foundation for the breathalyzer 
t e s t i s considered by th i s Court, the record demonstrates an 
adequate legal foundation was s t ipula ted or otherwise proved as 
Dutlined in Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (1983), a case 
decided subsequent to the one a t bar . The s t ipu la t ion and facts 
demonstrated fact that the ca l ib ra t ion and tes t ing for accuracy 
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were properly performed, in the regular course of d u t i e s , in 
accordance with accepted s tandards ; fu r the r , the records were 
accurately and contemporaneously kept. As such, the breath t e s t 
r e s u l t s were properly admitted. 
3. The case of Sal t Lake City v . Carver, 664 P.2d 1168 
(1983) i s d i spos i t i ve of p l a i n t i f f ' s claim tha t the Miranda 
warning must be given before f ie ld sobriety t e s t s can be given. 
This Court joined the majority of j u r i s d i c t i o n s throughout the 
U.S. in holding tha t a Miranda type warning applied only to 
involuntary custodial in t e r roga t ions . This Court has ruled tha t 
non-testimonial evidence gathering does not v io l a t e the Utah 
Consti tut ion provision against se l f - incr imina t ion provided in 
Ar t i c l e I §12. American Fork City v . Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 
(1985) Field sobrie ty t e s t s are observat ional t e s t s and not 
test imonial and hence, not within i t s p rovis ions . Further , no ex 
post facto pr inc ip le i s violated in using the 1985 Crosgrove 
r a t i ona l e to the ins tan t case , as claimed by Appellant-Womack, 
becuase: (a) no s t a t u t e i s involved, and (b) no vested c o n s t i t u -
t ional r igh t against se l f - incr imina t ion through f ie ld sobriety 
t es t ing existed in Utah prior to her a r r e s t . Therefore, no 
p r iv i l ege against se l f - incr imina t ion existed and no Miranda type 
yarn ing was requi red . 
4. Appellant-Womack did not object to the ins t ruc t ions a t 
the time of t r i a l . These issues were f i r s t raised on the appeal 
to the D i s t r i c t Court. As such, Appellant-Womack i s precluded 
from ra i s ing these ob jec t ions . 
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5. The t o t a l i t y of the ins t ruc t ions given show the t r i a l 
court made clear the presumption was a permissive factual 
inference and not a mandatory presumption of g u i l t which shifted 
the burden of proof or changed the presumption of innocence. The 
cour t spec i f i ca l ly instructed the jury tha t the presumption could 
not a r i se unt i l the jury concluded the t e s t was val id . The court 
further spec i f i ca l ly instructed the jury tha t the presumption 
. . .may be rebut ted. By tha t , I mean that those 
presumptions can be overccme by competent evidence . . . 
the jury sha l l weigh a l l avai lable evidence introduced 
to determine whether or not the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicat ing l iquor . 
Thus, the t r i a l court properly instructed the jury as to the 
ef fec t of the factual presumption and the conviction was v a l i d . 
Also, any claimed error based upon ins t ruc t ions could not be and 
were not pre judic ia l e r ror because of other indicat ion of driving 
while in toxica ted . These include e r r a t i c d r iv ing , s lurred 
speech, smelling of alcohol, admission of drinking and fa i l ing 
f i e ld sobriety t e s t i n g . 
6. As to the other matters raised by Appe11ant-Wornack, they 
are misconstructions of the case law and the testimony a t 
t r i a l . The testimony a t t r i a l does not show unequal protect ion 
of the law in giving or fa i l ing to give the Miranda warning. For 
example, the law does not require a verbatim reading of the 
implied consent law. The explanation given by the officer of the 
implied consent law was an accurate summation. Whether or not a 
l icense would be "suspended" for a year or "revoked" i s a 
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d i f f e r e n c e w i t h o u t s u b s t a n c e . In any e v e n t , t h e p o t p o u r r i o f 
i s s u e s r a i s e d , w i t h o u t c i t a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y , d o n o t r i s e t o a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e l and a r e n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t o r 
a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by f a c t o r l a w . 
V I I 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER NON-
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ON A CASE ARISING IN 
CIRCUIT COURT. 
S e c t i o n 7 8 - 3 - 5 , U t a h Code A n n . , s t a t e s : 
D e c i s i o n s o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on a p p e a l s f r o n c i r c u i t 
c o u r t s s h a l l b e f i n a l e x c e p t i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e . 
T h i s c o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g s t a t u t o r y 
r e v i e w o n a p p e a l s f r o n c i r c u i t c o u r t a r e p r e c l u d e d f rom s u p r e m e 
c o u r t r e v i e w . B r i g ham C i t y v . D r a k e , 709 P . 2d 3 6 9 ( O c t o b e r 3 0 , 
1 9 8 5 ) ; S t a t e v . B o o n e , 677 P . 2 d 1114 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . 
A p p e l l a n t - W o m a c k , i n h e r b r i e f , t r i e s t o r a i s e P o i n t I o f 
h e r b r i e f t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e l s i m p l y by a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e 
l o w e r c o u r t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y e r r e d . A r e v i e w o f t h e p o i n t 
s h o w s no o t h e r r e f e r e n c e t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e and n o t o n e 
c i t a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y s u g g e s t i n g t h e i s s u e i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
o n e . R a t h e r , t h e p o i n t i s a q u a r r e l w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a n i n - c o u r t s t i p l u a t i o n o f f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e 
1 P a g e 14 a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f . 
- 1 0 -
r e l i a b i l i t y of a b r e a t h a l y z e r machine and t e s t . The e v i d e n t i a r y 
i s s u e s c l e a r l y do n o t r i s e t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u r e a n d , 
t h e r e f o r e , a r e no t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t . As s u c h , t h e 
m a t t e r s a rgued i n P o i n t I of a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f must be d i s m i s s e d 
a s n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t . 
POINT I I 
EVEN IF THE ISSUE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE BREATHALYZER EVIDENCE 
WAS PROPER. 
Even a c c e p t i n g a rguendo t h a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y i s s u e of t h e 
a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e b r e a t h a l y z e r t e s t i s b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , i n 
t h e c a s e of Murray C i t y v . H a l l , upon which a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s so 
h e a v i l y , t h i s Cour t s p e c i f i c a l l y r u l e d § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 3 , Utah Code Ann. 
was a v a l i d e x c e p t i o n to t h e h e a r s a y r u l e and d i d no t deny 
a p p e l l a n t t h e r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Th i s Cour t h e l d : 
S e c t i o n 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 3 i s m e r e l y a c o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e 
f i n d i n g s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h a p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n fo r 
t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of b r e a t h a l y z e r e v i d e n c e . I t i s a 
l e g i s l a t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e u n i v e r s a l a c c e p t a n c e o f 
t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of such e v i d e n c e . _Id_. a t p . 1320. 
In t h e c a s e a t b a r , Appel lant-Womack s t i p u l a t e d to t h e 
e v i d e n t i a l f o u n d a t i o n r e q u i r e d by t h i s c o u r t in t h e Murray C i t y 
: a s e , ( s u p r a ) . The t r a n s c r i p t ( i n s p i t e of a p p e l l a n t ' s w r i t t e n 
a rgumen t s i n t h e m a r g i n s t h e r e o f ) and a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o t e s t a t i o n s 
-663 P .2d 1314 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . 
JSee R - 3 0 6 - 3 1 3 , Tp 134 t o 1 3 9 ) . 
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to the contrary , c lear ly show tha t appel lant s t ipula ted to the 
tes t imonial foundation required by th i s Court. S ign i f ican t ly , 
both the c i r c u i t court judge who received the s t i pu la t ion and the 
d i s t r i c t court judge who reviewed the t r a n s c r i p t , ruled the 
s t i p u l a t i o n was su f f i c i en t . 
The record on appeal amply sus ta ins both judges in the i r 
dec is ions . I t demonstrates tha t a p p e l l a n t ' s a t torney s t ipu la ted 
t h a t , i f c a l l ed , Trooper Nielson would t e s t i f y tha t he had 
checked the machine 20 days pr ior to the incident and 20 days 
a f t e r the incident ; a t both times he found the machine to be 
working properly. (R-306-307). Such a s t i pu l a t i on meets the 
aff irmative finding by a t r i a l court t h a t : (1) the ca l i b r a t i on 
and t es t ing for accuracy were properly performed; (2) checking 
and tes t ing were done in the regular course of d u t i e s ; (3) 
records were contemporaneously made and kept; (4) the source of 
information and preparat ion were such to indicate t rus twor th i -
ness . In shor t , the r e q u i s i t e elements for admiss ibi l i ty which 
t h i s Court ruled could be done by a f f idav i t were es tab l i shed , in 
the ins tan t case , by the s t i p u l a t i o n . 
In addition to t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n , the off icer administering 
the t e s t to appel lant appeared a t t r i a l , was sworn and t e s t i f i e d 
^Appellant 's br ief , pp. 11-14. 
5(R-310-311; R-440 contains Circui t Court ru l ing ; R-140 contains 
Dis t r i c t Court ru l ing . ) 
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as to exactly what was done a t the time of the t e s t . (R-236-
244). Cross-examination was extensive on the matters as to the 
o f f i c e r ' s t ra ining and qua l i f i ca t ions and method of administering 
the t e s t . (R-244-253). If any issue was presented, i t went to 
the weight not the adv i sab i l i t y of the evidence. As a jury 
question/ i t was properly presented, argued and submitted. The 
adverse verdic t to a defendant with an e r a t i c driving pa t t e rn , 
who smelled of alcohol , admitted to drinking and failed a f ie ld 
sobr ie ty t e s t should not be overturned in t h i s appeal. If there 
was e r r o r , i t was not pre judic ia l and the verdict should be 
offered . 
The l e g i s l a t u r e , in Section 41-6-44(3) Utah Code Ann, and 
t h i s Court in the Murray City case , properly concluded tha t the 
breathalyzer was universa l ly accepted as r e l i a b l e , i f operat ional 
c r i t e r i a were met. The a p p e l l a n t ' s s t ipu la t ion supplied the 
r e l i a b i l i t y of the operat ional data required by t h i s court in 
Murray City v. Hall , supra. The off icer who conducted the t e s t 
explained the manner of the t e s t and was cross examined 
extensively. 
Therefore, a l l requirements for admiss ib i l i ty of the t e s t 
were met, no pre judic ia l er ror existed and the judgments of the 
Ci rcu i t and D i s t r i c t Courts should be affirmed. 
Statement of Fact No. 8. 
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POINT I I I 
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS PERFORMED VOLUNTARILY BY 
SUSPECTED DRUNK DRIVERS FOLLOWING A TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION STOP ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE; 
SPECIFICALLY, SUCH TESTS DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 
I , SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONCERNING 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION OR REQUIRE A 
"MIRANDA" TYPE WARNING. 
A . FIELD SCBRIETY TESTS DO NOT VIOLATE UTAH CONSTI-
TUTIONAL PROVISION AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION. 
A p p e l l a n t - W o m a c k o p i n e s , w i t h o u t c i t a t i o n o f r e l e v a n t 
a u t h o r i t y , t h a t p o l i c e c o n d u c t e d f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t s a r e 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . C o n t r a r y t o a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n , t h i s C o u r t 
h a s s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e and r u l e d t h a t s u c h t e s t s 
d o n o t v i o l a t e t h e s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n p r o h i b i t i n g o n e 
o 
t o be compe l l ed a g a i n s t g i v i n g " e v i d e n c e " a g a i n s t o n e s e l f . S a l t 
Lake C i t y v . C a r n e r , 664 P .2d 1168 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . 
In C a r n e r , t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n r e a s o n e d t h a t t h e r e was no 
c u s t o d i a l s t o p i n a t r a f f i c o f f e n s e s i t u a t i o n ; f u r t h e r , t h e 
d e f e n d a n t ( l i k e t h e c a s e a t b a r ) was o b s e r v e d d r i v i n g in an 
e r r a t i c p a t t e r n , had s l u r r e d speech and s m e l l e d of a l c o h o l ; s h e 
a l s o v o l u n t a r i l y a t t e m p t e d t h e t e s t s when r e q u e s t e d . The 
m a j o r i t y d e t e r m i n e d frcm such f a c t s t h a t t h e r e was v o l u n t a r y 
c o m p l i a n c e a n d , t h e r e f o r e , h e l d : 
See P o i n t I I I of A p p e l l a n t - W o m a c k ' s B r i e f , p . 2 1 . 
8 A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 1 2 , C o n s t i t u t i o n of Utah . A l s o , n o t e t h a t 
t h e r e i s no f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e i n v o l v e d in t h a t t he 
F i f t h Amendment i s l i m i t e d t o a " t e s t i m o n i a l " o r "ccmmunicat i v e " 
p r i v i l e g e . Schmeber v . C a l i f . , 384 U . S . 757, 76 ( 1 9 6 6 ) . 
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. . . the defendant was not 'compelled to give evidence 
against himself1 in v io la t ion of our s t a t e cons t i tu -
t i o n . _Id_. a t p. 1172, 
Jus t ice Durham concurred in the decis ion , but would have ruled 
Hhat there was compulsion and a "custodial" in terrogat ion in the 
f ield sobriety tes t ing process, but tha t the Utah Consti tution 
protected only "test imonial" evidence. 
I t i s also s ign i f i can t to note that no r a t iona le in the 
Darner case held that Ar t ic le I §12 of the Utah Consti tut ion 
r ight was involved; r a t h e r , the majority merely elected to 
3iscuss the issues of volunteerism and custody in the context of 
a rout ine t r a f f i c stop by p o l i c e . I t spec i f i ca l ly noted: 
As a r e s u l t , we do not reach the question whether the 
taking of f ie ld sobriety t e s t s cons t i t u t e s giving 
evidence against oneself as protected by Art ic le I , 
Section 12, Utah Const i tu t ion. _Id_. 1172. 
Subsequently, t h i s Court c l ea r ly held tha t non-testimonial 
evidence gathering did not v io l a t e the Utah cons t i tu t iona l 
provision against se l f - inc r imina t ion . American Fork City v . 
Crosgrove, 701 P. 2d 1069 (Utah 1985). In Crosgrove, t h i s Court 
held: 
We therefore hold that defendant 's r i g h t s under the Utah 
Const i tut ions 1 se l f - incr iminat ion provisions were not 
v io la t ed , when af ter his a r r e s t , he was required to 
submit to a breathalyzer t e s t under the th rea t of losing 
a d r i v e r ' s l i c ense . Because i t i s inconsis tent with the 
r e s u l t we reached today, Hansen v. Owens [619 P.2d 315 
(Utah 1980)] . . . i s hereby overruled. American Fork 
City v. Crosgrove, Id. a t 1075. 
Note Appellant-Womack' s incorrect c i t a t i o n of t h i s case for a 
contrary holding, Appellant 's Brief at p . 21 . 
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Appellant-Womack appears to suggest in Point I I I t h a t there 
was a c lear cons t i t u t iona l r i gh t not to submit to f ield sobr ie ty 
t e s t s under the Utah Const i tut ional provision prohibi t ing self 
incr iminat ion, pr ior to the 1985 Crosgrove decis ion. ° No 
re levan t au thor i ty i s c i ted for the asse r t ion and the law and 
fac ts are contrary to tha t a s s e r t i o n . 
For example, the f i r s t Utah case addressing the p r iv i lege 
against se l f incrimination involved the use of a suspec t ' s shoes, 
vo lun ta r i ly provided to pol ice of f icers by the defendant, for 
comparison with footpr in ts made a t the scene of the crime. Here, 
t h i s Court held tha t the voluntary nature of the act by the 
defendant demonstrated the defendant was not "compelled" to give 
evidence against himself. The court noted: 
[W]here the accused vo lun ta r i ly places his foot in the 
t racks or surrenders his shoes to the sher i f f , he cannot 
object to the evidence tha t they seemed to f i t . State 
v . Sirmay, 112 Pac. 748, 753, (Utah 1912). 
The Court will note the close s i m i l a r i t y to those facts and the 
voluntary nature of Appellant-Womack1 s submission to f ie ld 
sobr ie ty t e s t in the case a t bar . 
In 1979, t h i s Court ru led: 
1
• • • suspects have no cons t i tu t iona l r i gh t to refuse 
the t e s t designed to produce physical evidence in the 
form of a breath sample [ c i t a t ions omitted] . . . 
Appel lan t ' s br ief a t p. 21, where she a s s e r t s to ru le against 
her would be a v io la t ion of the cons t i t u t iona l prohibi t ion 
against ex post facto laws. 
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'The value of such object ive s c i en t i f i c data of 
in toxicat ion to supplement the f a l l i b l e observation by 
humans of behavior seemingly symptomatic of in toxicat ion 
cannot be disputed [c i t a t ion omit ted] . In a day when 
excessive loss of l i f e and property i s caused by 
inebriated d r i v e r s , an imperative need ex i s t s for a 
f a i r , e f f i c i en t and accurate system of de tec t ion , 
enforconent and, hence prevention.1 Cavaness v. Cox , 
598 P.2d 349, (Utah 1979), c i t i ng People v. Sudduth, 421 
P.2d 401 (Cal . , 1966) (emphasis added). 
Again, in 1982, th i s Court held tha t a defendant who was required 
to pa r t i c ipa t e in a l ine-up and to u t t e r ce r ta in words had not 
been compelled to give evidence against himself within the 
cons t i tu t iona l context. State v. Spence, 497 P.2d 636 (Utah 
1982). 
I t i s respect ful ly submitted tha t t h i s Court has cons is -
t en t ly spoken since 1912 and rejected the argument of Appellant-
Womack tha t pol ice observations of a suspec t ' s physical 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and demeanor f a l l within the meaning of Ar t i c le 
I, Section 12 of the Utah Consti tut ion protect ion against self-
incrimination. The r i gh t of police to gather facts has always 
included the r igh t to obtain breath samples and to view f ie ld 
sobriety t e s t s . Thus, i t can hardly be said that some vested 
cons t i tu t iona l r ight would be impaired by ruling no pr iv i lege of 
se l f - incr iminat ion i s applicable to f ield sobriety t e s t i n g . That 
pos i t ion has been cons is ten t with Utah law since a t l ea s t 1912. 
In addi t ion, i t must be noted that the 1980 Hansen v. Owens 
decision cited by appel lant was narrowly r e s t r i c t e d to i t s facts 
shor t ly a f te r i t s adoption and some two years before the a r r e s t 
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of Appe l lan t -Womack . S t a t e v . McCumber, 622 P . 2d 3 53 (Utah 
1 9 8 0 ) . Nothing i n Owens o r s u b s e q u e n t d e c i s i o n s c o n s t r u i n g i t 
g i v e anyone t h e r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t f i e l d s o b r i e t y 
t e s t i n g was c o n t r a r y t o Utah c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w . 
B. APPELIANT-WOMACK'S ANALOGY TO EX POST FACTO 
PROTECTIONS OF THE UTAH OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 
IS A MISPLACED GENERALIZATION. 
Ex p o s t f a c t o a p p l i e s o n l y t o l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t s w h i c h : 
' p u n i s h e s a s a c r ime an a c t p r e v i o u s l y c o m m i t t e d , which 
was i n n o c e n t when d o n e ; which makes more burdensome t h e 
p u n i s h m e n t f o r a c r i m e , a f t e r i t s c o m m i s s i o n , o r which 
d e p r i v e s one c h a r g e d w i t h c r i m e of any d e f e n s e a v a i l a b l e 
a c c o r d i n g to law a t t h e t ime when t h e a c t was 
c c m m i t t e d . . . . S t a t e v . N o r t o n , 675 P .2d 5 7 7 , 585 
(Utah 1983) q u o t i n g Dobber t v . F l o r i d a , 432 U . S . 282, 
292 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
The i s s u e of i n t e r p r e t i n g A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 12 of t h e Utah 
C o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t a l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t and t h e i s s u e s 
p r e s e n t e d do n o t f i t t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e ex p o s t f a c t o 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e above summar ized . 16A Am. J u r . 2d 
" C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law" §6 38 a t p . 5 9 0 - 9 1 . 
However, i f more c o r r e c t l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a q u e s t i o n 
i n v o l v i n g Due P r o c e s s , t h e r e i s ( p e r h a p s ) an i s s u e ; t h a t i s , 
would a r u l i n g t h a t f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t i n g d i d n o t v i o l a t e t h e 
s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n be an 
u n f a i r r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l i n g a n d , h e n c e , u n c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l . T h i s w r i t e r a cknowledges t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e v e s t e d o r 
c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t s may may n o t be e n l a r g e d , d e s t r o y e d o r 
e l i m i n a t e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y . A l s o , i n a c r i m i n a l c o n t e x t , p e r s o n s 
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have a r i gh t to a warning of what conduct wil l give r i s e to 
criminal sanct ions. Equally important, however, i s the fact tha t 
such r i g h t s must be "substantive" and "vested"; procedural or 
evidentiary rules are not included in the concept. Dept. of 
Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982); Boucofski v . 
Jacobson, 36 Utah 165, 104 p . 117 (1909); 16A Am. Jur .2d, Id. 
No federal r igh t against se l f - incr iminat ion i s claimed by 
appe l lan t ; also as above noted, no Utah r i gh t existed protecting 
a t r a f f i c v io la to r frcm f ie ld sobriety tes t ing on the basis tha t 
such t e s t may v io la te a r i gh t against se l f - incr imina t ion . Thus, 
no vested or c lea r ly a r t i cu la ted Utah cons t i tu t iona l r igh t 
existed upon which Appellant Womack could reasonably have 
r e l i e d . There ex i s t s no legal bas is to claim a due process 
v i o l a t i o n . 
In addi t ion, a t the time of the sobriety t e s t ing of 
Appellant-Womack, the law was clear that performing the road side 
t e s t s was not a "custodial" in terrogat ion and/or was 
"voluntary". As such, appellant waived an objection by 
performing the t e s t s . Salt Lake City v . Carner, supra. 
I t i s respectful ly submitted tha t Utah cons t i tu t iona l law or 
due process p r inc ip les do not bar the evidentiary use of the 
f ield sobriety t e s t s or the i r r e s u l t s as a basis of probable 
cause to a r res t and conduct a breathalyzer t e s t on appel lant . 
The lower c o u r t ' s judgments should be affirmed. 
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C. VIRTUALLY EVERY OTHER STATE, INCLUDING STATES 
WITH SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL LANGUAGE TO ARTICLE I , 
SECTION 12 OF UTAH'S CONSTITUTION, HAVE RULED NO 
MIRANDA TYPE WARNINGS MUST BE GIVEN TO MAKE FIELD 
SOBRIETY TEST RESULTS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
In a d d i t i o n t o t h e h o l d i n g s o f t h i s C o u r t i n C a r n e r and 
C r o s g r o v e , t h e s o u n d r e a s o n i n g of v i r t u a l l y o t h e r c o u r t known t o 
t h e w r i t e r , w h i c h h a v e c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e s of f i e l d s o b r i e t y 
t e s t i n g , h a s h e l d t h e t e s t r e s u l t s t o b e e v i d e n c e , n o t w i t h i n t h e 
s c o p e o f t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . Fo r e x a m p l e , 
o u r s i s t e r s t a t e C o l o r a d o e x t e n s i v e l y r e s e a r c h e d t h i s i s s u e and 
i n a w e l l r e a s o n e d o p i n i o n c o n c l u d e d : 
C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e a s o n i n g e x p r e s s e d i n t h o s e 
o p i n i o n s [ n u m e r o u s o t h e r s t a t e and f e d e r a l d e c i s i o n s , 
p l u s t h e r e a s o n i n g of r e l a t e d C o l o r a d o c a s e s ] , we now 
h o l d t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n d o e s 
n o t e x t e n d t o t h e r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d from a r o a d s i d e 
s o b r i e t y t e s t . P e o p l e v . R a m i r e z , 609 P . 2 d 6 1 6 , 621 
( C o l o . , 1 9 8 0 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) 
The R a m i r e z c o u r t c o r r e c t l y n o t e d : 
In r e a c h i n g o u r d e c i s i o n , we a r e m i n d f u l o f t h e f a c t 
t h a t , a l t h o u g h a r o a d s i d e s o b r i e t y t e s t n e c e s s a r i l y 
r e s t s o n t h e s u b j e c t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n s o f t h e t e s t i n g 
o f f i c e r , i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s d e s i g n e d t o r e v e a l o b j e c t i v e 
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e d r i v e r ' s c o o r d i n a t i v e c a p a b i l i -
t i e s . L i k e t h e b l o o d t e s t c o n s i d e r e d i n S c h m e r b e r , a 
s o b r i e t y t e s t i s p r e m i s e d on t h e p r e d i c t a b l e e f f e c t s o f 
t h e c o n s u m p t i o n of e t h y l a l c o h o l : 
. . . The t e s t ' s p u r p o s e i s t o o b t a i n t a n g i b l e e v i d e n c e 
of a s u s p e c t ' s p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n , and t o t h a t e n d , t h e 
s u b j e c t i s r e q u e s t e d t o e x h i b i t h i s b o d y f o r v i s u a l 
i n s p e c t i o n . I n no i n s t a n c e , h o w e v e r , d o e s t h e t e s t 
c o n t r a v e n e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e F i f t h Amendment by 
r e q u i r i n g t h e s u b j e c t t o d i v u l g e a n y k n o w l e d g e h e m i g h t 
hav e . The f a c t t h a t t h e s u b j e c t ' s q u i l t may b e i n f e r r e d 
from t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e t e s t g o e s t o t h e p r o b i t y o f t h e 
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t e s t i n g method, not to i t s c h a r a c t e r as a supposed 
confess ion s u r r o g a t e . People v . Ramirez , Id . a t p . 621 
(emphasis added) 
Of p a r t i c u l a r importance i s the l i n e of s t a t e cases having 
s i m i l a r or i d e n t i c a l language to Utah 's C o n s t i t u t i o n ; t h a t i s , 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s which use the word "evidence" r a t h e r than the word 
" t e s t i f y . " I l l u s t r a t i v e of these S t a t e s with the "evidence" 
language ( l i k e Utah ' s C o n s t i t u t i o n ) i s New Hampshire. In a 
r e c e n t case of t h a t S t a t e on t h i s p r ec i s e i s s u e of f i e l d s o b r i e t y 
t e s t i n g v i s - a - v i s the p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court c a r e f u l l y analyzed the problems. I t 
ru led such s o b r i e t y t e s t to be " r e a l " or "phys i ca l " ev idence , not 
1
 The C o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n i s drawn to note 8 of the Ramirez 
d e c i s i o n . There a r e l i s t e d d e c i s i o n s from 19 s e p a r a t e s t a t e s 
which have a l so so r u l e d ; t h i s l i s t i nc ludes our s i s t e r s t a t e s of 
C a l i f o r n i a , Montana, Arizona and Washington; see a l s o , Erwin, 
Defense of Drunk Driving Cases , §3 2 . 0 2 ( 4 ) . These cases inc lude 
s t a t e s with i d e n t i c a l or s i m i l a r language to A r t i c l e I , Sec t ion 
12 of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n ; e . g . , I l l i n o i s : Ci ty of Highland 
Park v. Block, 362 N.E.2d 1107 ( 1 1 1 . , 1977); Pennsylvania : 
Commonwealth v . Kloch, 327 A.2d 3 75 ( P a . , 1974); Oklahoma: F l i n t 
v. S t a t e , 507 P.2d 586 ( S . C t . P a . , 1974); Kansas: S t a t e v . 
Fa id l e y , 450 P.2d 20 (Kan., 1969); New Hampshire: S t a t e v . 
Ar senau l t , d i scussed i n f r a ; Washington: City of Mercer I s land v . 
Walker, 458 P.2d 274 (Wash., 1969). 
P lease cf . two r e c e n t cases which concern a l l e g e d l y r e q u i r e d 
Miranda warnings r e l a t e d to consen t s or r e f u s a l s to take 
b r e a t h a l y z e r t e s t s . Washington r e j e c t e d a claim t h a t the r i g h t 
to counsel had been v i o l a t e d by a f a i l u r e to t i e a s p e c i f i c 
Miranda type n o t i c e of a r i g h t to re fuse the t e s t and have an 
a t t o r n e y ' s a d v i c e . S t a t e v . Wurm, 647 P. 2d 508 (Ct.App. Wash., 
1982). South Dakota excluded a vo lun ta ry s ta tement about a 
r e f u s a l because : " I 'm too drunk; I won ' t pass the t e s t . " The 
Court held i t was not r e a l or phys i ca l ev idence ; t hence , i t was 
excluded from a c r imina l t r i a l . South Dakota v . N e v i l l e , 312 
N.W.2d 723 (S .D. , 1981), c e r t . g r . 5/17/82 50 L.W. 3915. 
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subject to the p r i v i l e g e ; hence, no Miranda warning or p r iv i l ege 
waiver was required. I t s t a t ed : 
Defendants have adverted to a difference in the language 
of a r t i c l e 15, part 1 of our State cons t i tu t ion which 
reads : 'No subject sha l l . . . be compelled to accuse 
or furnish evidence against himself . ' I t i s ccmmonly 
held tha t the ' v a r i e t y of cons t i tu t iona l or s ta tu tory 
phrasing nei ther enlarges nor narrows the scope of the 
p r iv i l eges as developed in the common law.1 8 J . 
Wigmore, Evidence §22 5 2 a t 32 6. Sharing tha t view, th i s 
cour t has stated tha t the pr iv i lege under our State 
cons t i tu t ion i s 'one against test imonial compulsion 
only, and that i t i s inappl icable . . . where the 
evidence i s real ra ther than t e s t imon ia l . ' ( c i t a t i on 
omitted) 
The f ie ld sobriety t e s t s challenged here are of a 
s imilar na ture . They are premises upon the r e l a t ionsh ip 
between in toxica t ion and the externa l ly manifested loss 
of coordination which i t causes. These t e s t s do not 
seek to compel from the defendant any knowledge he might 
have ( c i t a t i o n omit ted) ; nor do they involve the 
defendant 's commun ica t ive f acu l t i e s in any way, 
( c i t a t i o n omit ted) . They only compel him to exhibi t h i s 
physical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of coordinat ion. ( c i t a t i o n 
emi t ted) . Thus the f ie ld sobriety t e s t s do not 
cons t i tu t e test imonial compulsion but are merely a 
source of real or physical evidence and are not within 
the pr iv i lege against se l f - inc r imina t ion . Consequently 
the ru le of Miranda v . Arizona, . . . i s not involved. 
State v. Arsenault, 336 A.2d 244, 246, 247 (N.H. 1975) 
(emphasis added). See also City of Mercer Island v . 
Walker, 458 P.2d 274 (Wash., 1969), a s t a t e a f te r which 
Utah's Const i tut ion was pa t te rned . 
The exclusionary rule and the Miranda warning concerning the 
p r iv i l ege against se l f - incr imina t ion and the r i gh t to counsel 
were developed to : (a) protect against police excesses, (b) 
guarantee tha t waivers of cons t i tu t iona l r i gh t s would be 
knowingly done, and (c) avoid test imonial statements of an 
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uninformed suspect which might inculpate an otherwise innocent 
person. However, as nearly a l l appel la te courts considering the 
issue have held, f i e ld sobriety t e s t s pose no such dangers. 
A police off icer cannot compel an innocent suspect to 
confess g u i l t through f ie ld sobriety t e s t s . The off icer merely 
observes a suspec t ' s "mental or physical condition" as provided 
in the Utah Rules of Evidence. Broadening the reach of the 
pr iv i lege against se l f - incr iminat ion to prohibi t police testimony 
concerning f ie ld sobriety t e s t s (where no Miranda warning has 
been given) only serves to protect the gu i l ty and i t does nothing 
to aid the fa lse ly accused. 
The aim of j u s t i c e i s tha t the gu i l ty be convicted, as well 
as tha t the innocent be acqui t ted . Rules to exclude or admit 
evidence should not become ends in themselves, but must be 
measured against the needs of society and the r i g h t s of 
ind iv idua ls . The inconvenience to the suspected intoxicated 
dr iver by a request to perform a f ie ld sobriety t e s t must be 
weighed against the possible danger to soc ie ty . As t h i s Court 
s ta ted of the Miranda warning and the r igh t against self-
incr iminat ion: 
. . . [ I ] t i s important to have in mind the or ig in and 
purpose of those r i g h t s . They came into being as a 
safeguard against oppressive methods and abuses by which 
innocent persons were imposed on and sometimes unjustly 
convicted and punished. We have no des i re to pursue a 
policy which i s anything less than a zealous respect for 
those r i g h t s . But nei ther the i r purpose, nor the 
safeguarding of the peace and good order of society are 
served if the protect ion of individual r igh t s i s so 
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dis tor ted as to give i r responsible protect ions to 
criminal conduct and impose such r e s t r i c t i o n s on peace 
off icers tha t they are thwarted in the i r e f for t s to 
ccmbat crime. 
If i t appears t ha t an accused has been in any way abused 
or unfair ly dea l t with, so tha t there i s any reasonable 
doubt tha t he was j u s t l y convicted, the conviction 
should not be permitted to stand. On the other hand, 
unless there i s something of tha t charac te r , these 
sa lu tary pro tec t ions of law should not be so perverted 
as to permit gu i l t y persons to escape convict ion. (Note 
omitted.) State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah, 
1979) (emphasis added) 
Our j ud i c i a l system works when an equi table balance i s 
maintained between the r i g h t s of victims and soc ie ty , on the one 
s i de , and the r i g h t s of defendants on the o the r . I t i s a 
s ign i f i can t i n t e r e s t of society to have i t s highways free from 
dr ive r s whose consumption of alcohol makes them dangerous to 
themselves and o the r s . Such dangers are not imaginary. For 
example the Utah Department of Transportation s t a t e s tha t there 
were 3,166 alcohol r e l a t ed accidents and 77 alcohol r e l a t ed 
deaths in 197 9. In 19 80, according to the Utah Highway Safety 
Program Office, 80 of 125 d r ive r s involved in fa ta l acc iden ts , 
had been dr inking. 
Extending the p r iv i l ege and superimposing a Utah Miranda 
type exclusionary r u l e , as suggested by Appellate-Womack, i s not 
only contrary to a l l thoughtful jud ic i a l precedent, but does 
l i t t l e to advance the leg i t imate r i gh t s of individual l i b e r t y or 
j ud i c i a l f a i rnes s . In fac t , i t must be noted tha t f ie ld t e s t s 
benef i t both the suspect and socie ty . When the person suspected 
- 2 4 -
of b e i n g u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l p e r f o r m s w e l l on s u c h 
t e s t s , h e l e a v e s t o p u r s u e h i s b u s i n e s s w i t h o u t f u r t h e r i n t e r r u p -
t i o n . I f h e i s j u d g e d u n s a f e f o r f u r t h e r d r i v i n g , t h e o f f i c e r 
t a k e s t h e s u s p e c t o f f t h e h i g h w a y and t h e r e b y r e m o v e s t h e d a n g e r 
t o t h e s u s p e c t and t o t h e p u b l i c . T h u s , t h e f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t s 
a d v a n c e b o t h p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y and s o c i e t a l s a f e t y i n t e r e s t s 
h a r m o n i o u s l y . 
The j u d i c i a l e x c l u s i o n o f p o l i c e o f f i c e r ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s and 
s c r e e n i n g of s u s p e c t e d d r u n k d r i v e r s , by t h e u s e of f i e l d 
s o b r i e t y t e s t s , m u s t e i t h e r r e q u i r e e n f o r c e m e n t t o s u f f e r o r 
r e q u i r e p o l i c e t o a r r e s t more p e r s o n s and s u b j e c t t h e m t o 
b l o o d / a l c o h o l t e s t s . E i t h e r o p t i o n i s d i s t a s t e f u l . 
I t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d r u l e 
t h a t i n t h i s c a s e , f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t s w e r e n o t p r o t e c t e d by t h e 
p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , no ex p o s t f a c t o p r i n c i p l e s 
w e r e i n v o l v e d a n d , i n any e v e n t , n o e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e p r e m i s e d on 
a M i r a n d a - t y p e w a r n i n g n e e d b e g i v e n . 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IN GIVING THE JURY INSTRUCTION RELATING TO 
THE PRESUMPTION OF BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL. 
A . DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM RAISING THIS ISSUE FOR 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
T h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t e d , d u r i n g t h e t r i a l of t h i s c a s e , t o t h e l o w e r 
c o u r t ' s g i v i n g a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n r e l a t i n g t o A p p e l l a n t - W o m a c k 
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b e i n g p r e s u m p t i v e l y u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e b e c a u s e of a .18 
a l c o h o l / b l o o d l e v e l . Appel lant-Womack p r e s e n t e d , for t h e f i r s t 
t ime on a p p e a l , t h e a rgumen t t h a t t h e g i v i n g of t h e a f o r e m e n -
t i o n e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . 
T h i s Cour t h a s r u l e d , on many o c c a s i o n s , t h a t i t w i l l no t 
r u l e on a c o n t e n t i o n p r e s e n t e d for t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l . 
S t a t e v . C h a n c e l l o r , 704 P .2d 579 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) ; S t a t e v . Lee , 633 
P .2d 48 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) , c e r t d e n . 454 U.S . 1057 , 102 S . C t . 606 , 70 
L . E d . 2 d 595 ( 1 9 8 1 ) . See a l s o S t a t e v . G i b s o n , 665 P .2d 1302 
(Utah 1 9 8 3 ) , c e r t d e n . 464 U .S . 894 , 78 L .Ed .2d 2 3 1 , 104 S . C t . 
241 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . 
T h i s C o u r t s h o u l d d e c l i n e t o c o n s i d e r t h i s c l a i m of e r r o r by 
t h e d e f e n d a n t . 
B. THE INSTRUCTION IS CONSISTENT WITH RULINGS 
REGARDING PER SE LAWS. 
The Appel lant -Womack was c h a r g e d under S e c t i o n 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 
r a t h e r t h a n t h e more s t r i n g e n t S e c t i o n 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 2 , a l t h o u g h t h e 
BAC was 0.18%. The j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n o b j e c t e d to by a p p e l l a n t was 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same a s t h e l a n g u a g e r e g a r d i n g p r e s u m p t i o n s 
c o n t a i n e d in S e c t i o n 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 , Utah Code Ann . , 1953, i n e f f e c t a t 
t h e t ime t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was g i v e n , which r e a d : 
If t h e r e was a t t h e t ime 0 . 0 8 p e r c e n t o r more by w e i g h t 
of a l c o h o l in t h e p e r s o n ' s b l o o d , i t s h a l l be presumed 
t h a t t h e p e r s o n was under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l ; 
The b lood a l c o h o l l e v e l of t h e d e f e n d a n t in t h i s i n s t a n c e was . 1 8 
p e r c e n t , more t h a n two t i m e s t h e p r e s u m p t i v e l e v e l r e f e r r e d to in 
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the sub jec t i n s t r u c t i o n . In 1973, the Utah L e g i s l a t u r e amended 
Sect ion 41-6-44 , Utah Code Ann. by enac t ing Sec t ion 41-6-44.2 
tfhich made ope ra t ing a motor v e h i c l e with a blood a lcohol con ten t 
Df .10 pe rcen t o r g r e a t e r a "per se" v i o l a t i o n of the law. The 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h a t amendment was upheld in Greaves v . 
S t a t e , 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974) . 
In Murray City v . H a l l , 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) t h i s Court 
held t h a t : 
By enac t ing §41-6 -44 .2 , the Utah L e g i s l a t u r e intended to 
amend Utah ' s DUI laws so t h a t : (1) a BAC of 0.08 pe rcen t 
o r g r e a t e r but l e s s than 0.10 p e r c e n t g i v e s r i s e to a 
r e b u t t a b l e presumption t h a t one i s under the i n f luence 
of a l coho l and (2) a BAC of 0.10 p e r c e n t o r g r e a t e r 
g ives r i s e to a conc lus ive presumption t h a t one i s under 
the in f luence of a l c o h o l . 
Since the BAC in the i n s t a n t case was well above the 0.10 p e r c e n t 
l e v e l , the s u b j e c t j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n would have no a p p l i c a t i o n to 
the e x t e n t t h a t i t provided for a r e b u t t a b l e presumption t h a t one 
i s under the in f luence of a lcohol upon a f inding of a BAC of 0.10 
pe rcen t o r g r e a t e r . 
This C o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t a conc lus ive presumption under 
Sec t ion 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 2 , Utah Code Ann, i s not in v i o l a t i o n of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n (Murray City v . H a l l , supra) was subsequent in time 
to the l i n e of cases c i t e d by a p p e l l a n t which found conc lus ive 
presumptions u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l in c e r t a i n i n s t a n c e s . Morissete v . 
United S t a t e s , 342 U.S. 246 96 L.Ed. 288, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1951); 
Sandstrum v . Montana, sup ra , (1979) , S t a t e v . Robichaux, supra , 
(1981), and S t a t e v . Walton, s u p r a , (1982). 
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I t i s c lear tha t t h i s Court views the presumptions 
es tabl ished in Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. (as amended by 
Section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Ann.) as being d i f fe ren t in kind 
from the prohibited presumptions referred to in the c i ted l ine of 
cases ci ted by appe l lan t . Such a d i s t i n c t i o n is j u s t i f i ed on 
several grounds. F i r s t : 
I t i s well accepted tha t the operation of a motor 
vehicle on the public highways i s a p r iv i l ege , and not a 
r ight , subject to reasonable regulat ion under the s t a t e 
pol ice power in the i n t e r e s t of public safety and 
welfare. State of Utah v. Chancellor, supra, a t 580, 
(emphasis added); S ta te v. Garner, 608 P. 2d 1321 (Kansas 
1980); Smith v. Mahoney, 590 P.2d 323, 324 (Utah 1979); 
7A Am. Jur .2d "Automobiles and Highway Traffic1", §11, p . 
199. 
Secondly, t h i s Court has found tha t a dr iver has no 
cons t i t u t iona l pr iv i lege to refuse a breath t e s t . Larson v . 
Schwendiman, 712 P.2d 244 (Utah 1985). Also, i t i s the law of 
t h i s s t a t e tha t enactment of s t i f f e r pena l t i es for drinking 
d r ive r s i s not unconst i tu t ional and tha t the removal of an in ten t 
requirement frcm the DUI s t a t u t e i s not uncons t i tu t iona l , so long 
as the s t a tu t e appl ies equally to a l l members in the c l a s s and so 
long as there i s a valid reason for a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by the 
Legis la tu re . State v. Chancellor, supra; State v. Twitchel, 
supra. In shor t , the police power regula t ion of the pr iv i lege of 
using public highways prohibi t ing the i r use by intoxicated 
persons and rebutable procedural presumptions based on 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y predic tab le physiological r e s u l t s of alcohol 
consumption are not the same as presumptions of criminal in ten t 
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i n a t h e f t o r homic ide c a s e . Appellant-Womack h a s n o t c i t e d a 
c a s e in p o i n t on p r e s u m p t i o n s i n d runk d r i v i n g c a s e s and h e r 
u n w a r r a n t e d e x t e n s i o n s of s i m i l a r c a s e s s h o u l d be r e j e c t e d a s was 
o b s e r v e d by t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme C o u r t : 
[The motor v e h i c l e code] was d e s i g n e d to p r o t e c t t h e 
p u b l i c frcm t h e menace of a u t o m o b i l e s o p e r a t e d upon t h e 
p u b l i c highway w i t h i n a d e q u a t e o r no e f f i c i e n t c o n t r o l , 
in a world of t r a f f i c d i f f i c u l t of management under 
normal c o n d i t i o n s , and s h o u l d be l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d to 
e f f e c t i t s p u r p o s e . Peop le v . E k s t r o m e r , 23 5 P a c . 69 
( C a l i f o r n i a ) ; a l s o 7 Am. J u r .2d A u t o m o b i l e s & Highway 
T r a f f i c , §298, p . 4 8 0 . 
C. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR OVERRULING THE 
DISTRICT COURT, ACTING AS AN APPELLATE COURT, ON 
THIS ISSUE. 
On a p p e a l from t h e judgmen t of an i n t e r m e d i a t e c o u r t , e v e r y 
f a c t and law n e c e s s a r y t o upho ld t h e lower C o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n 
and t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of i t s d e c i s i o n w i l l be p r e sumed , i n t h e 
a b s e n c e of a c l e a r showing t o t h e c o n t r a r y . 5B Corpus J u r i s 
Second urn, Appeal & E r r o r §1817 . Al though t h i s C o u r t h a s r u l e d 
t h a t where an i s s u e i s s o l e l y one of l a w , t h e Supreme Cour t i s 
n o t bound by t h e c o n c l u s i o n s of law of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i t h a s 
a l s o r u l e d t h a t i t w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e a c t i o n of t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t , u n l e s s i t a b u s e s i t s d i s c r e t i o n o r m i s a p p l i e s c o r r e c t 
p r i n c i p l e s of l a w . Be t en son v . C a l l Auto , 64 5 P .2d 684 (Utah 
1 9 8 2 ) ; J e p p s o n v . J e p p s o n , 684 P . 2d 6 9 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . The lower 
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n w i l l be a f f i r m e d i f a p r o p e r l e g a l b a s i s e x i s t s , 
even though n o t on a ground on which t h e lower c o u r t r e l i e d in 
i t s r u l i n g . C i t y E l e c t r i c v . I n d u s t r i a l Indemni ty C o . , 683 P.2d 
1053 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . 
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In the case a t bar, the Honorable J . Dennis Frederick of the 
Di s t r i c t Court of the Third Jud ic ia l D i s t r i c t , s i t t i n g as an 
appe l la te court in the i n i t i a l appeal of t h i s case from the 
Circui t Court, ruled tha t the jury ins t ruc t ion r e l a t i ng to the 
presumption of being under the influence of alcohol was not 
uncons t i tu t iona l . (R-145-14 6) • 
Judge Frederick cor rec t ly noted tha t presumptions of fact 
are provided, both under Utah s t a tu to ry law, and by the Utah 
Rules of Evidence^ (former Rule 14A). (R-145). Judge Frederick 
dis t inguished the jury ins t ruc t ions in Sandstrom v. State of 
Montana, 3 S ta te v . Robichaux, and State v. Walton, 5 s ince 
these ins t ruc t ions were conclusory and e f fec t ive ly eliminated 
in t en t as an element of a criminal offense. He ruled tha t in the 
ins tan t case , the presumption i s not as to one of the prima facie 
elements of the crime charged; r a t h e r , i t was a factual 
presumption or permissive inference which merely allows the t r i e r 
of fact to find the inferred fact from the basic fac t . 
(R-146). See State v. Dacey, 418 A.2d 856 (Vt. 1980). 
l z S e c t i o n 76-1-503, Utah Code Ann., 1953. 
13442 U.S. 510, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979). 
14639 P.2d 207 (Utah 1981). 
15646 P.2d 689 (Utah 1982). 
-3 0 -
Li<yw i>-:. .** l a t e r c a s e s c i t e d hv a p p e l l a n t a*~e 
a i s t i n q u i s h a b Le j s n - i J u d g e F r ^ e r ; / ^ -> r ^ a s^ * i-<: . 7 r a n c 
in t e n . j .1 :^\ ^i<~ , a
 3<-. /->-- s u b s e q u e n * -h d e c i s i o n s , S t a t e 
v . C h a m b e r s , - -» ; ^ • id >ta r e .- • D i c w - : - * 712 
I *e- . -g tr.v. . . jrv 
: »uf p o s s e s s i o n y r e c e n t ^ . * / - s t o l e n p r o p e r t y - e a b s e n c e o: 
1 * - * ,_oC3o^^ * , 1*; [A ./LH; L LV . myelin, t i ne se c ^ s e s 
i n v o l v e ! - h e pr ima f a c i e c r i m i n a l e lement- * i n t e n t 
i n s t r u e t i c 
given i *-.
 a : : - . . - > . < , ;._ .* p e ; a v - < . ^ < * w a s 
i v r 1 i v n : * / e d „ v » ^ ' t su i icuL 
c . .ennp r ,, _ ; t ,, * *- ^  
v . T w i t e h e l l , 3 3 : r>* ^o \ •• - ' t < - » * . 
• 11. INSTRUCTION ^IVEN 3/ , inJ ft I , C Z I IR I \ tfAS • 
S IMPI Y A PE RM ISS IVE INF ERENC F 
The Un i t ed S t a t e s Si 1 pr erne Cc 1 11: t i 1: 1 Fr a nc i s y E 1: a n!-.. . \ * 
s u p r a , made a d i . 3 U . i ' j . n j ! b e t w e e n . - . anda tory" p r e s u m p t i o n w h i c h 
i n s t r u c t •- r / ie "j ur ' +:nar- : • •),•:• . ^ »-he nr^* :rr~^1 ?3c+~ " f: *"u ^  
w n i j n s u g g e s t - ) .\ ' ie j u r
 y 1 p o s s i b l e c o n c i i i s i )n - be i r i . , f 
t i e S t a t e p r o v e s p r e d i c t t o t a c t s , OuL d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t n e r 
1 6 4 71 U . S . _ , 8 5 L , E d . 2 d 3 4 4 , 1 0 5 S . C t • 
( L ' ^ 8 5 1 . 
to draw tha t conclusion. To determine whether or not a 
p a r t i c u l a r jury ins t ruc t ion e s t ab l i shes a mandatory presumption 
or a permissive inference: 
r equ i res careful a t t en t ion to the words ac tua l ly spoken 
to the jury . . . , for whether a defendant has been 
accorded his cons t i tu t iona l r igh t s depends upon the way 
in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the 
i n s t r u c t i o n . Francis , supra, c i t ing Sandstrom, supra, 
a t 514, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450. 
The ins t ruc t ion in the ins tan t case, 7 i s c l ea r ly a 
permissive inference, ra ther than a mandatory presumption. 
Appellant argues t ha t the word "shal l" ra ther than the word "may" 
changes the presumption frcm permissive and proper to conclusive 
and uncons t i tu t iona l . However, such a d i s t i n c t i o n goes far 
beyond the mandatory language found in the ins t ruc t ions in the 
cases ci ted by the appe l lan t . While in some contexts , the word 
" sha l l " may be in terpre ted as a d i r e c t i v e , a common de f in i t ion of 
the word "shal l" i s t ha t which one wil l be able to or can do. 
See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1064 (1974). The 
Suprone Court of Vermont, in Sta te v . Dacey, supra, (reversed on 
other grounds) examined the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of jury 
ins t ruc t ions derived frcm a s imilar DUI s t a t u t e . That court 
found tha t the s t a t u t e i t s e l f "create[d] a permissive inference, 
not a mandatory presumption," p. 858, " sh i f t s no burden to the 
defendant, and permits but does not compel a jury finding tha t 
1 7(R-317, 318). 
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Fran bo th t h e s p e c i f i c l a n g u a g e of t h e p a r t i c u l a r j u r y 
i n s t r u c t i o n r e l a t i n g t o b e i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l and 
frcm t h e accompanying l a n g u a g e in o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n f a 
r e a s o n a b l e j u r y c o u l d o n l y have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a s 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r e n c e , r a t h e r t h a n a m a n d a t o r y 
p r e s u m p t i o n . 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR DENYING APPELLANT-
WOMACK 'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, BASED ON THE ALLEGED 
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION. 
In P o i n t I I of a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f , a p o t p o u r r i of a s s e r t i o n s 
of e r r o r a r e made under t h e b r o a d a e g i s of due p r o c e s s and e q u a l 
p r o t e c t i o n . O t h e r t h a n c i t i n g t h e s e broad c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
c o n c e p t s , no c i t a t i o n of r e l e v a n t a u t h o r i t y i s made and none h a v e 
"I O 
mer i t . ° Fur ther , the factual premises of the arguments are not 
supported by the record. In tha t these arguments are made 
without separate heading, a summary of the argument wil l be made 
with Respondent-City's r ep ly . 
1. Appellant-Womack s t a t e s tha t the r igh t to a fa i r t r i a l 
incorporates the r i g h t to be advised of and to confront the 
evidence to be used against a person a t t r i a l , so tha t an 
1 Q 
i n t e l l i g e n t defense can be preferred. 
See pp. 17-18 Appellant-Womack's br ie f . 
See a p p e l l a n t ' s b r ie f , p . 17. 
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Equally important, however, i s the fact that Appellant-
Womack has incor rec t ly c i ted the f ac t s . The off icer spec i f i c a l l y 
denied giving a Miranda warning because i t was not required; he 
t e s t i f i e d : 
Q. (Hansen) Aren ' t you obligated to advise her of 
her r i g h t s cal led the Miranda warning the minute she 
i s in custody? 
A. (Police Officer) No, s i r . 
Q. You don ' t believe t h a t ' s true? 
A. Not for t h i s offense, no. 
. . . 
Q. Do you ever give the Miranda warning? 
A. On occasion, yes. 
Q. At your d i scre t ion? 
A. If I plan to do other th ings , yes. (R-295) 
(emphasis added) 
Those questions and answers do not c rea te d i f fe ren t treatment for 
people within the same c l a s s , as suggested by appe l l an t . 
3. Appellant-Womack takes issue with the fact that the 
police off icer did not read, verbatim Utah's impLied consent law, 
r a t h e r , a l legedly only received a summary of i t s provis ions . 
Spec i f ica l ly , she appears to object tha t the police indicated 
2 1 t h a t her l icense may be "suspended" ra ther than revoked. x 
* See paragraph 17 of a p p e l l a n t ' s brief, 
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s a n c t i o n s than, t h o s o v*1 r . n r i z e ' . \ -; . . j ' j f - - i t h e r * :?n 
s u g g e s t i n g a l e s s -i- — *-
t . _ 1 . . ^^ . j u c .1 was n o t p r e j u u : -
c i i. V) a p p e l . v ' i n f o r m e d c o n s e n t . 
Fur uit- - A hr I 11 n< 1 .1 
G r a s s m a n an-, E l l i o t t : , - u l i e ' . - *\ LC.I r e q u i r e t h a t t h e o f f i c e r 
g i v e a v e r b a t i m r e a d i n g -*- — —,-i —q - / - M ^ O ^ * - t a t i i t i 1 . L'hose 
c •» •- - - • - 1 ui )i l:»y t h e 
O t i i c e r
 ; ,01 1 c s c j i i t e - in;)i led c o t i s e i v s t a t u t e a p p l i c a b l e 
i ' i ICt S 2 ^;nvMT; e+--*->- t n a L a - ^un win a 
c e w a r n e d oy a p e a ^ 3 , r * . ^ ^ . eque su L lg t h e 
t o s i o r t e s t s t h a t a r e f u s a l t o s u n / n i t J * he t e ^ t ;»- t - * - ^ - 1 1 
1 Jinj . a o i o ac : e d : o n t r a r \ *_ ^ a p p e i i a : i s s e r t : . e r e • 
no r e q u i r e m e n t sr .n , . j t . )> ir c a s e l aw t .har * he* *^- ^ n f ^ - ^
 r e a c ] 
v e r b a t irn ' "7 
o :•: :. . c e r i 1 ic l ud ed t h e fo 11 owi r lg : 
2 2 5 4 3 P . 2d 1 - • . . _ . ._• ^ o . "Hi o f 
a p p e l I a n t ! s D r i e r . 
Q. (pol ice off icer) . . . i f they 'd [arrestee] 
refused, without reasonable explanation or reasonable 
cause, t h e i r driving p r iv i l eges could be suspended for 
a period of a year. (R-22 5) 
That information was accurate and conformed to cons t i tu t iona l and 
s t a t u to ry requirements. 
Also, i t must be noted tha t the cases of Grassman and 
E l l i o t t , c i ted by appel lan t , are t o t a l l y i r r e l evan t to the i ssue 
before the Court. Each of those cases dea l t with l icense 
revocation hearings and had nothing whatsoever to do with f ie ld 
sobr ie ty t es t ing admitting into a criminal t r i a l the r e s u l t s of a 
breathalyzer t e s t for driving under the influence of a lcohol . 
This court should not engraft a new ru le excluding valid evidence 
demonstrating drunk driving on the bas is tha t the off icer advised 
the dr iver tha t her l icense "might be suspended" if revoked. 
Appellant-Womak offers no log ica l r a t i o n a l e , public policy or 
precedent for such an extension. I t i s respec t fu l ly suggested 
tha t the fa i lu re to c i t e au thor i ty for the new rule urged by 
appel lan t i s a r e s u l t of the lack thereof in t h i s country. This 
new impedement to e f fec t ive law enforcement should be summarily 
rejected . 
4. Appellant-Womak suggests tha t the pol ice off icer did not 
advise her that she had a r i g h t to a l t e rna t ive t e s t s to the 
b rea thai yze r . 2 3 
See p. 18 of appe l l an t ' s b r ie f . 
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RESPONSE: ^ h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r '-ad t- • ^ . ** ^ c >--* - —» 
vr^ t e s t upd**- u td i i . c^.. . jv le Acn . 
. iw wa s a _ L . ..i.t- : ' cu r * . Conr ad v , 
Schwend iman , • -- niesj& i ~ " - ' 
P r n ~ . v , f a c o r : : ^ ^ t s j r o L ^ r 
< - - , . . . . . », -*) 
f . AC p e I 1 =» n - f- • n- - -* w . w . . - -
1 j j i a ^ e s . , * i . . d t i o r : DT n e r c o n s t , * 
t , ;r.,ii r U7.' -; 
RESPONSE- m e L 
CajL. , .ir -ii a v . F ^ ^ K o ^ C.Ed. 1 -i! :,, 104 
by m e - r e s e r v e c r ^ . i c c =* diLui.es 
i n t r o d a c - « . r e a t ^ - a n e l y s i s t e s t s o r , <->i-*-*^ -i >
 K 
i n v e r t , -* r t h e ~ t-K: - ^ ' * ' ^ 
9 ii ) r e a t n a i y z e r ampoules r 
)e e s t a b l i s h e d a t t n i i o\ - . o p r o o r i a t p a^f ^ i a ^ ^ s t r a n 
} f f i o ^ r >" ^ : v > - - : ' r XU r r a y ^ . J."L: j f 
ii ....
 ti.i - m a c * n a s t a i l e d r. > . * ± anv c a s e s 
liiow: v; c n a c t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o l l o w e d .i±^> i i i s t -
•]ol=>C i'^M -^ ^ : t " e e q u a l ^ r ^ c ^ c n . ^ n 
*_..- c ^ . o - . c: f. , :-^" . - iDsence of su. r. . a u t h o r i t y i 
r g u m e n t s n o c l j bo t i o i - ' • 
. . ca+" t h e o o t n o u r ^ - ' 
p p e l - a n •- • c r i e f , r - c n * "*£ l u e p r o c e s s ^ir ' >-* M ^ r - . * - - , . 
l a i m s a r e w i t h o u t m e r i t ar. - . - „ ^ : --. 
vi ir 
CONCLUSION 
No c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f i r m i t y e x i s t e d a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t l e v e l 
and t h e s t a t u t o r y b a s i s f o r t he drunk d r i v i n g c h a r g e i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . F u r t h e r , t h e f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t and p r e l i m i n a r y 
q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e a p p e l l a n t had been d r i n k i n g were no t 
s h i e l d e d by t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . The 
s o b r i e t y t s e t i n g was n o t t e s t i m o n i a l and t h e r o u t i n e t r a f f i c s t o p 
d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n of a c r i m i n a l 
s u s p e c t . 
The c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d and remanded f o r e x e c u t i o n 
of s e n t e n c e . 
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